These are quick notes made when this tweet, led to this reply, and this request - and therefore lots more thinking. I'm not sure this rephrase, which scales up the original 140 characters considerably is either true to the original, nor significantly more accessible, but I felt the notes worth sharing none-the-less.

In very broad a outline terms:

If taking risks leads to better outcomes overall (a greater total sum of utility) then it is right for the practitioner to take risks.

There is a 'right' way of doing things - and things should be done this way regardless of good or bad outcome.

The right thing is the thing done by the practitioner with virtue. Virtue is practical wisdom. Practical wisdom is something practitioners must constantly cultivate by reflective practice, and is something practitioners must exercise in each judgement. A judgement is right if it proceeds from virtue.

• (1) Taking risks with the outcome to the client (e.g. 'I'm not sure this (X) will work, but we'll try it anyway', when trying X could, if it doesn't work, lead to harm to the client)

• (2) Risking one's professional position (e.g. 'My actions could be questioned by managers/peers - and they could judge I have acted wrongly - which could lead to my job being in jeopardy')

Our intuition appears to tell us that causing harm by action is worse than causing harm by inaction.

Are these two morally equivalent:

• You push someone into the canal to drown.
• You see someone drowning in the canal, and you could rescue them without putting yourself at risk, but you don't.

There are a number of more developed thought experiments which explore this problem - but generate the conclusion that, at least according to most people's intuitive judgement, we are more culpable for our actions, than our inactions. (Not that we are blameless for our inaction, but we may be less worthy of blame morally).

Risks of type (1) do create the possibility of practitioners being more blame-worthy if things go wrong as a result of their actions, than they would be if things went wrong as a result of their inaction. Hence, even if not bourne out in media judgements, individuals intuitive decision making on model (1) may tend towards caution.

In risks of type (2) the practitioner who exercises their judgement has to be prepared to accept the consequences of their managers / peers taking a different judgement. If a practitioner does not believe their managers/peers will (a) be likely to have a similar judgement; and (b) will base their judgements on a reasoned and reflective approach to the case at hand; then the risk to the practitioners job and career from exercising judgement, rather than acting from the 'rule' is potentially very high indeed.

Now there is a *big* question.

But a take-away starting point is the need to develop a deeper understanding of what it means to call for more risk-taking in hard-edge practice. And then to think about which parts of the picture can be altered to encourage better but not necessarily 'riskier' practice.

• Practitioners more equipped to make, and act upon, their judgements;
• Practitioners equipped to make better judgements;
• Managers and management approaches which support sensitive practice;
• Managers and management approaches which root out bad judgements and bad practice;

Most important here is to recognise that approaches to the problem of getting better practice, when based on a virtue ethics approach, rather than a de-ontological/rule/duty approach, cannot proceed from centralised application of set processes and procedures. But neither do they proceed from a straightforward call for riskier practice.